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Abstract
Synthesis is the automated construction of a system from its specification. The system has to satisfy its
specification in all possible environments. Modern systems often interact with other systems, or agents. Many
times these agents have objectives of their own, other than to fail the system. Thus, it makes sense to model
system environments not as hostile, but as composed of rational agents; i.e., agents that act to achieve their
own objectives.
We introduce the problem of synthesis in the context of rational agents (rational synthesis, for short). The
input consists of a temporal-logic formula specifying the system and temporal-logic formulas specifying the
objectives of the agents. The output is an implementation T of the system and a profile of strategies, suggesting
a behavior for each of the agents. The output should satisfy two conditions. First, the composition of T with
the strategy profile should satisfy the specification. Second, the strategy profile should be an equilibria in the
sense that, in view of their objectives, agents have no incentive to deviate from the strategies assigned to them.
We solve the rational-synthesis problem for various definitions of equilibria studied in game theory. We also
consider the multi-valued case in which the objectives of the system and the agents are still temporal logic
formulas, but involve payoffs from a finite lattice.
1 Introduction
Synthesis is the automated construction of a system from its specification. The basic idea is simple and appealing:
instead of developing a system and verifying that it adheres to its specification, we would like to have an automated
procedure that, given a specification, constructs a system that is correct by construction. The first formulation of
synthesis goes back to Church [10]; the modern approach to synthesis was initiated by Pnueli and Rosner, who
introduced LTL (linear temporal logic) synthesis [32]. In LTL synthesis, the specification is given in LTL and the
output is a reactive system modeled by a finite-state transducer. Much of today’s research in formal verification
is aimed at increasing the practicality of automated synthesis, and it addresses challenges like simplification of
synthesis algorithms [19], compositionality and modularity [17, 23], extensions of the basic setting to richer ones
(c.f., synthesis of distributed systems, concurrent systems, and on-line algorithms [1, 2, 18, 25]), and extensions
of the underline techniques to further applications (c.f. automated control and repair [14, 33]).
In synthesis, there is a distinction between system outputs, controlled by the system, and system inputs,
controlled by the environment. A system should be able to cope with all values of the input signals, while setting
the output signals to desired values [32]. Therefore, the quantification structure on input and output signals is
different. Input signals are universally quantified while output signals are existentially quantified.
Modern systems often interact with other systems. For example, the clients interacting with a server are by
themselves distinct entities (which we call agents) and are many times implemented by systems. In the traditional
approach to synthesis, the way in which the environment is composed of its underlying agents is abstracted. In
particular, the agents can be seen as if their only objective is to conspire to fail the system. Hence the term “hostile
environment” that is traditionally used in the context of synthesis. In real life, however, many times agents have
goals of their own, other than to fail the system. The approach taken in the field of algorithmic game theory [29]
is to assume that agents interacting with a computational system are rational, i.e., agents act to achieve their own
goals. Assuming agents rationality is a restriction on the agents behavior and is therefore equivalent to restricting
the universal quantification on the environment. Thus, the following question arises: can system synthesizers
capitalize on the rationality and goals of agents interacting with the system?
Consider for example a peer-to-peer network with only two agents. Each agent is interested in downloading
infinitely often, but has no incentive to upload. In order, however, for one agent to download, the other agent
must upload. More formally, for each i ∈ {0, 1}, Agent i controls the bits ui (“Agent i tries to upload”) and di
(“Agent i tries to download”). The objective of Agent i is always eventually (di ∧ u1−i). Assume that we are
asked to synthesize the protocol for Agent 0. It is not hard to see that the objective of Agent 0 depends on his input
signal, implying he cannot ensure his objective in the traditional synthesis sense. On the other hand, suppose that
Agent 0, who is aware of the objective of Agent 1, declares and follows the following TIT FOR TAT strategy: I will
upload at the first time step, and from that point onward I will reciprocate the actions of Agent 1. Formally, this
amounts to initially setting u0 to True and for every time k > 0, setting u0 at time k to equal u1 at time k − 1. It
is not hard to see that, against this strategy, Agent 1 can only ensure his objective by satisfying Agent 0 objective
as well. Thus, assuming Agent 1 acts rationally, Agent 0 can ensure his objective.
The example above demonstrates that a synthesizer can capitalize on the rationality of the agents that constitute
its environment. When synthesizing a protocol for rational agents, we still have no control on their actions. We
would like, however, to generate a strategy for each agent (a strategy profile) such that once the strategy profile
is given to the agents, then a rational agent would have no incentive to deviate from the strategy suggested to
him and would follow it. Such a strategy profile is called in game theory a solution to the game. Accordingly, the
rational synthesis problem gets as input temporal-logic formulas specifying the objective ϕ0 of the system and the
objectives ϕ1, . . . , ϕn of the agents that constitute the environment. The desired output is a system and a strategy
profile for the agents such that the following hold. First, if all agents adhere to their strategies, then the result of
the interaction of the system and the agents satisfies ϕ0. Second, once the system is in place, and the agent are
playing a game among themselves, the strategy profile is a solution to this game.1
A well known solution concept is Nash equilibrium [27]. A strategy profile is in Nash equilibrium if no
agent has an incentive to deviate from his assigned strategy, provided that the other agents adhere to the strategies
assigned to them. For example, if the TIT FOR TAT strategy for Agent 0 is suggested to both agents, then the pair
of strategies is a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, for all i ∈ {0, 1}, if Agent i assumes that Agent 1 − i adheres to
his strategy, then by following the strategy, Agent i knows that his objective would be satisfied, and he has no
incentive to deviate from it. The stability of a Nash equilibrium depends on the players assumption that the other
players adhere to the strategy. In some cases this is a reasonable assumption. Consider, for example, a standard
protocol published by some known authority such as IEEE. When a programmer writes a program implementing
the standard, he tends to assume that his program is going to interact with other programs that implement the
same standard. If the published standard is a Nash equilibrium, then there is no incentive to write a program
that diverts from the standard. Game theory suggests several solution concepts, all capturing the idea that the
participating agents have no incentive to deviate from the protocol (or strategy) assigned to them. We consider
three well-studied solution concepts [29]: dominant-strategies solution, Nash equilibrium, and subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium.
An important facet in the task of a rational synthesizer is to synthesize a system such that once it is in place,
the game played by the agents has a solution with a favorable outcome. Mechanism design, studied in game theory
and economy [28, 29], is the study of designing a game whose outcome (assuming players rationality) achieves
some goal. Rational synthesis can be viewed as a variant of mechanism design in which the game is induced by
the objective of the system, and the objectives of both the system and the agents refer to their on-going interaction
and are specified by temporal-logic formulas.
Having defined rational synthesis, we turn to solve it. In [7], the authors introduced strategy logic – an
extension of temporal logic with first order quantification over strategies. The rich structure of strategy logic
enables it to specify properties like the existence of a Nash-equilibrium. While [7] does not consider the synthesis
problem, the technique suggested there can be used in order to solve the rational-synthesis problem for Nash
equilibrium and dominant strategies. Strategy logic, however, is not sufficiently expressive in order to specify
subgame-perfect-Nash equilibrium [35] which, as advocated in [37] (see also Section 3), is the most suited for
infinite multiplayer games — those induced by rational synthesis. The weakness of strategy logic is its inability to
quantify over game histories. We extend strategy logic with history variables, and show that the extended logic is
sufficiently expressive to express rational synthesis for the three solution concepts we study. Technically, adding
history variables to strategy logic results in a memoryful logic [21], in which temporal logic formulas have to be
evaluated not along paths that start at the present, but along paths that start at the root and go through the present.
1For a formal definition of rational synthesis, see Definition 3.1.
Classical applications of game theory consider games with real-valued payoffs. For example, agents may bid
on goods or grade candidates. In the peer-to-peer network example, one may want to refer to the amount of data
uploaded by each agent, or one may want to add the possibility of pricing downloads. The full quantitative setting
is undecidable already in the context of model checking [3]. Yet, several special cases for which the problem is
decidable have been studied [4]. We can distinguish between cases in which decidability is achieved by restricting
the type of systems [3], and cases in which it is achieved by restricting the domain of values [13]. We solve the
quantitative rational synthesis problem for the case the domain of values is a finite distributive De Morgan lattice.
The lattice setting is a good starting point to the quantitative setting. First, lattices have been successfully handled
for easier problems, and in particular, multi-valued synthesis [15, 16]. In addition, lattices are sufficiently rich to
express interesting quantitative properties. This is sometime immediate (for example, in the peer-to-peer network,
one can refer to the different attributions of the communication channels, giving rise to the lattice of the subsets
of the attributions), and sometimes thanks to the fact that real values can often be abstracted to finite linear orders.
From a technical point of view, our contribution here is a solution of a latticed game in which the value of the
game cannot be obtained by joining values obtained by different strategies, which is unacceptable in synthesis.
1.1 Related Work
Already early work on synthesis has realized that working with a hostile environment is often too restrictive. The
way to address this point, however, has been by adding assumptions on the environment, which can be part of
the specification (c.f., [5]). The first to consider the game-theoretic approach to dealing with rationality of the
environment in the context of LTL synthesis were Chatteerjee and Henzinger [8]. The setting in [8], however,
is quite restricted; it considers exactly three players, where the third player is a fair scheduler, and the notion of
secure equilibria [6]. Secure equilibria, introduced in [6], is a Nash equilibria in which each of the two players
prefers outcomes in which only his objective is achieved over outcomes in which both objectives are achieved,
which he still prefers over outcomes in which his objective is not achieved. It is not clear how this notion can be
extended to multiplayer games, and to the distinction we make here between controllable agents that induce the
game (the system) and rational agents (the environment). Also, the set of solution concepts we consider is richer.
Ummels [37] was the first to consider subgame perfect equilibria in the context of infinite multiplayer games.
The setting there is of turn-based games and the solution goes via a reduction to 2-player games. Here, we consider
concurrent games and therefore cannot use such a reduction. Another difference is that [37] considers parity
winning conditions whereas we use LTL objectives. In addition, the fact that the input to the rational synthesis
problem does not include a game makes the memoryful nature of subgame perfect equilibria more challenging, as
we cannot easily reduce the LTL formulas to memoryless parity games.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to handle the multi-valued setting. As we show, while the lattice
case is decidable, its handling required a nontrivial extension of both the Boolean setting and the algorithms
known for solving latticed games [16].
2 Preliminaries
We consider infinite concurrent multiplayer games (in short, games) defined as follows. A game arena is a tuple
G = 〈V, v0, I, (Σi)i∈I , (Γi)i∈I , δ〉, where V is a set of nodes, v0 is an initial node, I is a set of players, and for
i ∈ I , the set Σi is the set of actions of Player i and Γi : V → 2Σi specifies the actions that Player i can take
at each node. Let I = {1, . . . , n}. Then, the transition relation δ : V × Σ1 × · · · × Σn → V is a deterministic
function mapping the current node and the current choices of the agents to the successor node. The transition
function may be restricted to its relevant domain. Thus, δ(v, σ1, . . . , σn) is defined for v ∈ V and 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉 ∈
Γ1(v)× · · · × Γn(v).
A position in the game is a tuple 〈v, σ1, σ2, . . . , σn〉 with v ∈ V and σi ∈ Γi(v) for every i ∈ I . Thus, a
position describes a state along with possible choices of actions for the players in this state. Consider a sequence
p = p0 ·p1 ·p2 · · · of positions. For k ≥ 0, we use node(pk) to denote the state component of pk, and use pk[i], for
i ∈ I , to denote the action of Player i in pk. The notations extend to p in the straightforward way. Thus, node(p) is
the projection of p on the first component. We say that p is a play if the transitions between positions is consistent
with δ. Formally, p is a play starting at node v if node(p0) = v and for all k ≥ 0, we have node(pk+1) = δ(pk).
We use PG (or simply P when G is clear from the context) to denote all possible plays of G.
Note that at every node v ∈ V , each player i chooses an action σi ∈ Γi(v) simultaneously and independently
of the other players. The game then proceeds to the successor node δ(v, σ1, . . . , σn). A strategy for Player i
is a function πi : V + 7→ Σi that maps histories of the game to an action suggested to Player i. The suggestion
has to be consistent with Γi. Thus, for every v0v1 · · · vk ∈ V +, we have πi(v0v1 · · · vk) ∈ Γi(vk). Let Πi denote
the set of possible strategies for Player i. For a set of players I = {1, . . . , n}, a strategy profile is a tuple
of strategies 〈π1, π2, . . . , πn〉 ∈ Π1 ×Π2 × · · · ×Πn. We denote the strategy profile by (πi)i∈I (or simply π,
when I is clear from the context). We say that p is an outcome of the profile π if for all k ≥ 0 and i ∈ I , we
have pk[i] = πi(node(p0) · node(p1) · · · node(pk)). Thus, p is an outcome of π if all the players adhere to their
strategies in π. Note that since δ is deterministic, π fixes a single play from each state of the game. Given a profile
π we denote by outcome(π)G (or simply outcome(π)) the one play in G that is the outcome of π when starting
in v0. Given a strategy profile π and a nonempty sequence of nodes h = v0v1 . . . vk, we define the shift of π by
h as the strategy profile (πhi )i∈I in which for all i ∈ I and all histories w ∈ V ∗, we have πhi (w) = πi(h · w).
We denote by outcome(π)Gh (or simply outcome(π)h) the concatenation of v0v1 . . . vk−1 with the one play in
G that is the outcome of πh when starting in vk. Thus, outcome(π)h describes the outcome of a game that
has somehow found itself with history h, and from that point, the players behave if the history had been h.
Given a profile (πi)i∈I , an index j ∈ I , and a strategy π′j for Player j, we use (π−j , π′j) to refer to the profile
of strategies in which the strategy for all players but j is as in π, and the strategy for Player j is π′j . Thus,
(π−j , π
′
j) = 〈π1, π2, . . . , πj−1, π
′
j, πj+1, . . . , πn〉.
3 Rational Synthesis
In this section we define the problem of rational synthesis. We work with the following model: the world consists
of the system and a set of n agents Agent 1, . . . ,Agent n. For uniformity we refer to the system as Agent 0. We
assume that Agent i controls a set Xi of variables, and the different sets are pairwise disjoint. At each point in
time, each agent sets his variables to certain values. Thus, an action of Agent i amounts to assigning values to his
variables. Accordingly, the set of actions of Agent i is given by 2Xi . We use X to denote
⋃
0≤i≤nXi. We use X−i
to denote X \Xi for 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Each of the agents (including the system) has an objective. The objective of an
agent is formulated using a linear temporal logic formula (LTL [31]) over the set of variables of all agents.2 We
use ϕi to denote the objective of Agent i.
This setting induces the game arena G = 〈V, v0, I, (Σi)i∈I , (Γi)i∈I , δ〉 defined as follows. The set of players
I = {0, 1, . . . , n} consists of the system and the agents. The moves of agent i are all the possible assignments to
its variables. Thus, Σi = 2Xi . We use Σ, Σi, and Σ−i to denote the sets 2X , 2Xi , and 2X−i , respectively. An agent
can set his variables as he wishes throughout the game. Thus Γi(v) = Σi for every v ∈ V . The game records in
its vertices all the actions taken by the agents so far. Hence, V = Σ∗ and for all v ∈ Σ∗ and 〈σ0, . . . , σn〉 ∈ Σ, we
have δ(v, σ0, . . . , σn) = v · 〈σ0, . . . , σn〉.
At each moment in time, the system gets as input an assignment in Σ−0 and it generates as output an assign-
ment in Σ0. For every possible history h ∈ (Σ−0 ∪ Σ0)∗ the system should decide what σ0 ∈ Σ0 it outputs
next. Thus, a strategy for the system is a function π0 : Σ∗ → Σ0 (recall that Σ = Σ−0 ∪ Σ0 and note that indeed
V + = Σ∗). In the standard synthesis problem, we say that π0 realizes ϕ0 if all the computations that π0 generates
satisfy ϕ0. In rational synthesis, on the other hand, we also generate strategies for the other agents, and the single
computation that is the outcome of all the strategies should satisfy ϕ0. That is, we require outcome(π)G |= ϕ0
where G is as defined above. In addition, we should generate the strategies for the other agents in a way that would
guarantee that they indeed adhere to their strategies.
Recall that while we control the system, we have no control on the behaviors of Agent 1, . . . ,Agent n. Let
π0 : Σ
∗ → Σ0 be a strategy for the system in G. Then, π0 induces the game Gpi0 = 〈Σ∗, ǫ, I, (Σi)i∈I , (Γ′i)i∈I , δ〉,
where for i ∈ I \ {0}, we have Γ′i = Γi, and Γ′0(w) = {π0(w−0)}, where w−0 is obtained form w by project-
ing its letters on Σ−0. Recall that δ is restricted to the relevant domain. Thus, as Γ′0 is deterministic, we can
2We could have worked with any other ω-regular formalism for specifying the objectives. We chose LTL for simplicity of the presen-
tation.
regard Gpi0 as an n-player (rather than n + 1-player) game. Note that Gpi0 contains all the possible behaviors of
Agent 1, . . . ,Agent n, when the system adheres to π0.
Definition 3.1 (Rational Synthesis) Consider a solution concept γ. The problem of rational synthesis (with so-
lution concept γ) is to return, given LTL formulas ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, specifying the objectives of the system and the
agents constituting its environment, a strategy profile π = 〈π0, π1, . . . , πn〉 ∈ Π0 ×Π1 × · · · ×Πn such that both
(a) outcome(π)G |= ϕ0 and (b) the strategy profile 〈π1, . . . , πn〉 is a solution in the game Gpi0 with respect to the
solution concept γ. y
The rational-synthesis problem gets a solution concept as a parameter. As discussed in Section 1, the fact
〈π1, . . . , πn〉 is a solution with respect to the concept guarantees that it is not worthwhile for the agents consti-
tuting the environment to deviate from the strategies assigned to them. Several solution concepts are studied and
motivated in game theory. We focus on three leading concepts, and we first recall their definitions and motivations
in game theory. The common setting in game theory is that the objective for each player is to maximize his payoff
– a real number that is a function of the play. We use payoffi : P → R to denote the payoff function of player
i. That is, payoffi assigns to each possible play p a real number payoffi(p) expressing the payoff of i on p. For a
strategy profile π we use (with a slight abuse of notation) payoffi(π) to abbreviate payoffi(outcome(π)).
The simplest and most appealing solution concept is dominant-strategies solution. A dominant strategy is a
strategy that a player can never lose by adhering to, regardless of the strategies of the other players. Therefore, if
there is a profile of strategies π in which all strategies πi are dominant, then no player has an incentive to deviate
from the strategy assigned to him in π. Formally, π is a dominant strategy profile if for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and for
every profile π′ with π′i 6= πi, we have that payoffi(π′) ≤ payoffi(π′−i, πi). Consider, for example, a game played
by three players: Alice, Bob and Charlie whose actions are {a1, a2}, {b1, b2} and {c1, c2}, respectively. The game
is played on the game arena depicted in the left of Figure 1. The labels on the edges are marked by the possible
action moves. Each player wants to visit infinitely often a node marked by his initial letter. In this game, Bob’s
strategy of choosing b1 from Node 2 is a dominant strategy. All of the strategies of Charlie are dominating. Alice,
though, has no dominating strategy. Unfortunately, in many games some agents do not have dominant strategies,
thus no dominant-strategy solution exists. Naturally, if no dominant strategy solution exists, one would still like
to consider other solution concepts.
Another well known solution concept is Nash equilibrium [27]. A strategy profile is Nash equilibrium if no
player has an incentive to deviate from his strategy in π provided he assumes the other players adhere to the
strategies assigned to them in π. Formally, π is a Nash equilibrium profile if for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and for every
strategy π′i 6= πi, we have that payoffi(π−i, π′i) ≤ payoffi(π). For example, the strategy profile depicted in the
middle of Figure 1 by dotted edges is a Nash equilibrium of the game to its left. Knowing the strategy of the other
players, each player cannot gain by deviating from his strategy.
An important advantage of Nash equilibrium is that a Nash equilibrium exists in almost every game [30].3 A
weakness of Nash equilibrium is that it is not nearly as stable as a dominant-strategy solution: if one of the other
players deviates from his assigned strategy, nothing is guaranteed.
Nash equilibrium is suited to a type of games in which the players make all their decisions without knowledge
of other players choices. The type of games considered in rational synthesis, however, are different, as players do
have knowledge about the choices of the other players in earlier rounds of the game. To see the problem that this
setting poses for Nash equilibrium, let us consider the ULTIMATUM game. In ULTIMATUM, Player 1 chooses a
value x ∈ [0, 1], and then Player 2 chooses whether to accept the choice, in which case the payoff of Player 1 is
x and the payoff of Player 2 is 1 − x, or to reject the choice, in which case the payoff of both players is 0. One
Nash equilibrium in ULTIMATUM is π = 〈π1, π2〉 in which π1 advises Player 1 to always choose x = 1 and π2
advises Player 2 to always reject. It is not hard to see that π is indeed a Nash equilibrium. In particular, if Player 2
assumes that Player 1 follows π1, he has no incentive to deviate from π2. Still, the equilibrium is unstable. The
reason is that π2 is inherently not credible. If Player 1 chooses x smaller than 1, it is irrational for Player 2 to
reject, and Player 1 has no reason to assume that Player 2 adheres to π2. This instability of a Nash equilibrium is
especially true in a setting in which the players have information about the choices made by the other players. In
particular, in ULTIMATUM, Player 1 knows that Player 2 would make his choice after knowing what x is.
3In particular, all n-player turn-based games with ω-regular objectives have Nash equilibrium [9].
To see this problem in the setting of infinite games, consider the strategy profile depicted in the right of
Figure 1 by dashed edges. This profile is also a Nash equilibrium of the game in the left of the figure. It is,
however, not very rational. The reason is that if Alice deviates from her strategy by choosing a2 rather than a1
then it is irrational for Bob to stick to his strategy. Indeed, if he sticks to his strategy he does not meet his objective,
yet if he deviates and chooses b1 he does meet his objective.
This instability of Nash equilibrium has been addressed in the definition of subgame-perfect equilibrium [35].
A strategy profile π is in subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) if for every possible history of the game, no player
has an incentive to deviate from his strategy in π provided he assumes the other players adhere to the strategies
assigned to them in π. Formally, π is an SPE profile if for every possible history h of the game, player 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
and strategy π′i 6= πi, we have that payoffi(π−i, π′i)h ≤ payoffi(π)h. The dotted strategy depicted in the middle of
Figure 1 is a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Indeed, it is a Nash equilibrium from every possible node of the arena,
including non-reachable ones.
In the context of on-going behaviors, real-valued payoffs are a big challenge and most works on reactive
systems use Boolean temporal-logic as a specification language. Below we adjust the definition of the three
solution concepts to the case the objectives are LTL formulas.4 Essentially, the adjustment is done by assuming
the following simple payoffs: If the objective ϕi of Agent i holds, then his payoff is 1; otherwise his payoff is 0.
The induced solution concepts are then as followed. Consider a strategy profile π = 〈π1, . . . , πn〉.
• We say that π is a dominant strategy profile if for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and profile π′ with π′i 6= πi, if
outcome(π′) |= ϕi, then outcome(π′−i, πi) |= ϕi.
• We say that π is a Nash equilibrium profile if for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n and profile π′ with π′i 6= πi, if
outcome(π−i, π′i) |= ϕi, then outcome(π) |= ϕi.
• We say that π is a subgame-perfect equilibrium profile if for every history h ∈ Σ∗, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and profile
π′ with π′i 6= πi, if outcome(π−i, π′i)h |= ϕi, then outcome(π)h |= ϕi.
4 Solution in the Boolean Setting
In this section we solve the rational-synthesis problem. Let I = {0, 1, . . . , n} denote the set of agents. Recall that
Σi = 2
Xi and Σ = 2X , where X = ∪i∈IXi, and that the partition of the variables among the agents induces a
game arena with states in Σ∗. Expressing rational synthesis involves properties of strategies and histories. Strategy
Logic [7] is a logic that treats strategies in games as explicit first-order objects. Given an LTL formula ψ and
strategy variables z0, . . . , zn ranging over strategies of the agents, the strategy logic formula ψ(z0, . . . , zn) states
that ψ holds in the outcome of the game in which Agent i adheres to the strategy zi. The use of existential and
universal quantifiers on strategy variables enables strategy logic to state that a given profile consists of dominant
strategies or is a Nash equilibrium. However, strategy logic is not strong enough to state the existence of a subgame
perfect equilibrium. The reason is that a formula ϕ(z0, . . . , zn) in strategy logic assumes that the strategies z0, . . . ,
zn are computed from the initial vertex of the game, and it cannot refer to histories that diverge from the strategies.
We therefore extend strategy logic with first order variables that range over arbitrary histories of the game.
4.1 Extended Strategy Logic
Formulas of Extended Strategy Logic (ESL) are defined with respect to a game G = 〈V, v0, I, (Σi)i∈I , (Γi)i∈I , δ〉,
a set H of history variables, and sets Zi of strategy variables for i ∈ I . Let I = {0, . . . , n}, Σ = Σ0 × · · · × Σn,
and let ψ be an LTL formula over Σ. Let h be a history variable in H, and let z0, ..., zn be strategy variables in
Z0, . . . ,Zn, respectively. We use z as an abbreviation for z0, ..., zn. The set of ESL formulas is defined inductively
as follows.5
Ψ ::= ψ(z) | ψ(z;h) | Ψ ∨Ψ | ¬Ψ | ∃zi.Ψ | ∃h.Ψ
4In Section 5, we make a step towards generalizing the framework to the multi-valued setting and consider the case the payoffs are
taken from a finite distributive lattice.
5We note that strategy logic as defined in [7] allows the application of LTL path operators (© and U ) on strategy logic closed formulas.
Since we could not come up with a meaningful specification that uses such applications, we chose to ease the presentation and do not allow
them in ESL. Technically, it is easy to extend ESL and allow such applications.
We use the usual abbreviations ∧,→, and ∀. We denote by free(Ψ) the set of strategy and history variables that
are free (not in a scope of a quantifier) in Ψ. A formula Ψ is closed if free(Ψ) = ∅. The alternation depth of
a variable of a closed formula is the number of quantifier switches (∃∀ or ∀∃, in case the formula is in positive
normal form) that bind the variable. The alternation depth of closed formula Ψ is the maximum alternation depth
of a variable occurring in the formula.
We now define the semantics of ESL. Intuitively, an ESL formula of the form ψ(z;h) is interpreted over the
game whose prefix matches the history h and the suffix starting where h ends is the outcome of the game that
starts at the last vertex of h and along which each agent i ∈ I adheres to his strategy in z. Let X ⊆ H ∪
⋃
i∈I Zi
be a set of variables. An assignment AX assigns to every history variable h ∈ X ∩H, a history AX(h) ∈ V + and
assigns to every strategy variable zi ∈ X ∩ Zi, a strategy AX(zi) ∈ Πi. Given an assignment AX and a strategy
πi ∈ Πi, we denote by AX[zi←πi] the assignment A′X∪{zi} in which A
′
X∪{zi}
(zi) = πi and for a variable x 6= zi
we have A′
X∪{zi}
(x) = AX(x). For histories of the game w ∈ V + we define AX[h←w] similarly.
We now describe when a given game G and a given assignment AX satisfy an ESL formula Ψ, where X is
such that free(Ψ) ⊆ X. For LTL, the semantics is as usual [24].
(G,AX) |= ψ(z) iff outcome(AX(z))G |= ψ (G,AX) |= Ψ1 ∨Ψ2 iff (G,AX) |= Ψ1 or (G,AX) |= Ψ2
(G,AX) |= ψ(z;h) iff outcome(AX(z))GAX(h) |= ψ (G,AX) |= ∃zi.Ψ iff ∃πi∈Πi.(G,AX[zi←πi]) |= Ψ
(G,AX) |= ¬Ψ iff (G,AX) |=/ Ψ (G,AX) |= ∃h.Ψ iff ∃w∈V +.(G,AX[h←w]) |= Ψ
For an ESL formula Ψ we use [[Ψ]] to denote its set of satisfying assignments; that is, [[Ψ]] = {(G,AX) | X =
free(Ψ) and (G,AX) |= Ψ}. Given an ESL formula Ψ and a game graph G, we denote by [[Ψ]]G the assignment
AX to the free variables in Ψ such that (G,AX) ∈ [[Ψ]].
Before we show how [[Ψ]]G can be computed we show that ESL is strong enough to express the solution to the
rational-synthesis problems for the three solution concepts we study.
4.2 Expressing Rational Synthesis
We now show that the rational synthesis problem for the three solution concepts we study can be stated in ESL.
We first state that a given strategy profile y = (yi)i∈I is a solution concept on the game Gy0 , that is, the game
induced by G when Agent 0 adheres to his strategy in y. We use I−0 to denote the set {1, . . . , n}, that is, the set of
all agents except for the system, which is Agent 0. Given a strategy profile z = (zi)i∈I , we use (z−{i,0}, yi, y0) to
denote the strategy profile where all agents but i and 0 follow z and agents i and 0 follow yi and y0, respectively.
For i ∈ I , let ϕi be the objective of Agent i. For a solution concept γ ∈ {DS, NASH, SPE} and a strategy profile
y = (yi)i∈I , the formula Ψγ(y), expressing that the profile (yi)i∈I−0 is a solution with respect to γ in Gy0 , is
defined as follows.
• ΨDS(y) :=
∧
i∈I−0
∀z. (ϕi(z−0, y0)→ ϕi(z−{i,0}, yi, y0)).
• ΨNASH(y) :=
∧
i∈I−0
∀zi. (ϕi(y−i, zi)→ϕi(y)).
• ΨSPE(y) := ∀h.
∧
i∈I−0
∀zi. ((ϕi(y−i, zi, h)→(ϕi(y, h)).
We can now state the existence of a solution to the rational-synthesis problem with input ϕ0, . . . , ϕn by the
closed formula Φγ := ∃(yi)i∈I .(ϕ0((yi)i∈I) ∧ Ψγ((yi)i∈I)). Indeed, the formula specifies the existence of a
strategy profile whose outcome satisfies ϕ0 and for which the strategies for the agents in I−0 constitute a solution
with respect to γ in the game induced by y0.
4.3 ESL Decidability
In order to solve the rational-synthesis problem we are going to use automata on infinite trees. Given a set D of
directions, a D-tree is the set D∗. The elements in D∗ are the nodes of the tree. The node ǫ is the root of the tree.
For a node u ∈ D∗ and a direction d ∈ D, the node u · d is the successor of u with direction d. Given D and an
alphabet Σ, a Σ-labeled D-tree is a pair 〈D∗, τ〉 such that τ : D∗ → Σ maps each node of D∗ to a letter in Σ.
An alternating parity tree automaton (APT) is a tuple A = 〈Σ,D,Q, δ0, δ, χ〉, where Σ is the input alphabet,
D is the directions set, Q is a finite set of states, δ0 is the initial condition, δ is the transition relation and χ : Q 7→
{1, . . . , k} is the parity condition. The initial condition δ0 is a positive boolean formula over Q specifying the
initial condition. For example, (q1 ∨ q2)∧ q3 specifies that the APT accepts the input tree if it accepts it from state
q3 as well as from q1 or q2. The transition function δ maps each state and letter to a boolean formula over D×Q.
Thus, as with δ0, the idea is to allow the automaton to send copies of itself in different states. In δ, the copies are
sent to the successors of the current node, thus each state is paired with the direction to which the copy should
proceed. Due to the lack of space, we refer the reader to [11] for the definition of runs and acceptance.
Base ESL formulas, of the form ψ(z, h), refer to exactly one strategy variable for each agent, and one history
variable. The assignment for these variables can be described by a (Σ × {⊥,⊤})-labeled Σ-tree, where the Σ-
component of the labels is used in order to describe the strategy profile π assigned to the strategy variable, and
the {⊥,⊤}-component of the labels is used in order to label the tree by a unique finite path corresponding to the
history variable. We refer to a (Σ × {⊥,⊤})-labeled Σ-tree as a strategy-history tree. A node u = d0d1 . . . dk in
a strategy-history tree 〈Σ∗, τ 〉 corresponds to a history of the play in which at time 0 ≤ j ≤ k, the agents played
as recorded in dj . A label τ(u) = (σ0, . . . , σn,⊣) of node u describes (1) for each agent i, an action σi that the
strategy πi advises Agent i to take when the history of the game so far is u, and (2) whether the node is along the
path corresponding to the history. Among the |Σ| successors of u in the strategy-history tree, only the successor
u · τ(u) corresponds to a scenario in which all the agents adhere to their strategies in the strategy profile described
in 〈Σ∗, τ〉. We say that a path ρ in 〈Σ∗, τ 〉 is obedient if for all nodes u · d ∈ ρ, for u ∈ Σ∗ and d ∈ Σ, we have
d = τ(u). Note that there is a single obedient path in every strategy tree. This path corresponds to the single play
in which all agents adhere to their strategies. The {⊥,⊤} labeling is legal if there is a unique finite path starting at
the root, all of whose node are marked with ⊤. Note that there is a single path in the tree whose prefix is marked
by ⊤’s and whose suffix is obedient.
An ESL formula Ψ may contain several base formulas. Therefore, Ψ may contain, for each i ∈ I , several
strategy variables in Zi and several history variables in H. For i ∈ I , let {z1i , . . . , z
mi
i } be the set of strategy
variables in Ψ ∩ Zi. Recall that each strategy variable zji ∈ Zi corresponds to a strategy π
j
i : Σ
∗ → Σi. Let
{h1, . . . , hm} be the set of history variables in Ψ. Recall that each history variable h corresponds to a word in Σ∗,
which can be seen as a function wh : Σ∗ → {⊤,⊥} labeling only that word with ⊤’s. Thus, we can describe an
assignment to all the variables in Ψ by a Υ-labeled Σ-tree, with Υ = Σm00 × Σ
m1
1 × · · · × Σ
mn
n × {⊥,⊤}
m
.
We solve the rational synthesis problem using tree automata that run on Υ-labeled Σ-trees. Note that the
specification of rational synthesis involves an external quantification of a strategy profile. We construct an au-
tomaton U that accepts all trees that describe a strategy profile that meets the desired solution. A witness to the
nonemptiness of the automaton then induces the desired strategies.
We define U as an APT. Consider an ESL formula ψ(z, h). Consider a strategy tree 〈Σ∗, τ〉. Recall that ψ
should hold along the path that starts at the root of the tree, goes through h, and then continues to outcome(z)h.
Thus, adding history variables to strategy logic results in a memoryful logic [21], in which LTL formulas have to
be evaluated not along a path that starts at the present, but along a path that starts at the root and goes through
the present. The memoryful semantics imposes a real challenge on the decidability problem, as one has to follow
all the possible runs of a nondeterministic automaton for ψ, which involves a satellite implementing the subset
construction of this automaton [21]. Here, we use instead the {⊥,⊤}-component of the label of τ .
The definition of the APTAΨ for [[Ψ]]G works by induction on the structure of Ψ. At the base level, we have
formulas of the form ψ(z, h), where ψ is an LTL formula, z is a strategy profile, and h is a history variable. The
constructed automaton then has three tasks. The first task is to check that the {⊥,⊤} labeling is legal; i.e. there
is a unique path in the tree marked by ⊤’s. The second task is to detect the single path that goes through h and
continues from h according to the strategy profile z. The third task is to check that this path satisfies ψ. The
inductive steps then built on APT complementation, intersection, union and projection [26]. In particular, as in
strategy logic, quantification over a strategy variable for agent i is done by “projecting out” the corresponding Σi
label from the tree. That is, given an automaton A for Ψ, the automaton for ∃zi.Ψ ignores the Σi component that
refers to zi and checks A on a tree where this component is guessed. The quantification over history variables is
similar. Given an automaton A for Ψ the automaton for ∃h.Ψ ignores the {⊥,⊤} part of the label that corresponds
to h and checks A on a tree where the {⊥,⊤} part of the label is guessed.
Theorem 4.1 Let Ψ be an ESL formula over G. Let d be the alternation depth of Ψ. We can construct an APT
AΨ such that AΨ accepts [[Ψ]]G and its emptiness can be checked in time (d+ 1)-EXPTIME in the size of Ψ.
4.4 Solving Rational Synthesis
We can now reduce rational-synthesis to APT emptiness.
Theorem 4.2 The LTL rational-synthesis problem is 2EXPTIME-complete for the solution concepts of dominant
strategy, Nash equilibrium, and subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof: We have shown in Section 4.2 that the rational-synthesis problem for γ ∈ {DS, NASH, SPE} can be
specified by an ESL formula Φγ with one alternation. It follows from Theorem 4.1 that we can construct an APT
accepting [[Φγ ]]G (where G is as defined in Section 3) whose emptiness can be solved in 2EXPTIME. Hence, the
problem is in 2EXPTIME.
Hardness in 2EXPTIME follows easily from the 2EXPTIME-hardness of LTL synthesis [34]. Indeed, syn-
thesis against a hostile environment can be reduced to rational synthesis against an agent whose objective is true.
Remark 4.3 In the above we have shown how to solve the problem of rational synthesis. It is easy to extend our
algorithm to solve the problem of rational control, where one needs to control a system in a way it would satisfy
its specification assuming its environment consists of rational agents whose objectives are given. Technically, the
control setting induces the game to start with, thus the strategy trees are no longer Σ-trees, and rather they are
(S ×Σ)-trees, where S is the state space of the system we wish to control. y
5 Solution in the Multi-Valued Setting
As discussed in Section 1, classical applications of game theory consider games with quantitative payoffs. The
extension of the synthesis problem to the rational setting calls also for an extension to the quantitative setting.
Unfortunately, the full quantitative setting is undecidable already in the context of model checking [3]. In this
section we study a decidable fragment of the quantitative rational synthesis problem: the payoffs are taken from
finite De-Morgan lattices. A lattice 〈A,≤〉 is a partially ordered set in which every two elements a, b ∈ A have
a least upper bound (a join b, denoted a ∨ b) and a greatest lower bound (a meet b, denoted a ∧ b). A lattice is
distributive if for every a, b, c ∈ A, we have a ∧ (b ∨ c) = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c). De-Morgan lattices are distributive
lattices in which every element a has a unique complement element ¬a such that ¬¬a = a, De-Morgan rules
hold, and a ≤ b implies ¬b ≤ ¬a. Many useful payoffs are taken from finite De-Morgan lattices: all payoffs that
are linearly ordered, payoffs corresponding to subsets of some set, payoffs corresponding to multiple view-points,
and more [15, 16].
We specify qualitative specifications using the temporal logic latticed LTL (LLTL, for short), where the truth
value of a specification is an element in a lattice. For a strategy profile π and an LLTL objective ϕi of Agent i, the
payoff of Agent i in π is the truth value of ϕi in outcome(π). A synthesizer would like to find a profile π in which
payoff0(π) is as high as possible. Accordingly, we define the latticed rational synthesis as follows.
Definition 5.1 (Latticed Rational Synthesis) Consider a solution concept γ. The problem of latticed rational
synthesis (with solution concept γ) is to return, given LLTL formulas ϕ0, . . . , ϕn and a lattice value v ∈ Ł, a
strategy profile π = 〈π0, π1, . . . , πn〉 ∈ Π0 × Π1 × · · · × Πn such that (a) payoff0(π) ≥ v and (b) the strategy
profile 〈π1, . . . , πn〉 is a solution in the game Gpi0 with respect to the solution concept γ. y
In the Boolean setting, we reduced the rational-synthesis problem to decidability of ESL. The decision pro-
cedure for ESL is based on the automata-theoretic approach, and specifically on APT’s. In the lattice setting,
automata-theoretic machinery is not as developed as in the Boolean case. Consequently, we restrict attention to
LLTL specifications that can be translated to deterministic latticed Bu¨chi word automata (LDBW), and to the
solution concept of Nash equilibrium.6
6A Bu¨chi acceptance conditions specifies a subset F of the states, and an infinite sequence of states satisfies the condition if it visits F
infinitely often. A generalized Bu¨chi condition specifies several such sets, all of which should be visited infinitely often.
An LDBW can be expanded into a deterministic latticed Bu¨chi tree automata (LDBT), which is the key
behind the analysis of strategy trees. It is not hard to lift to the latticed setting almost all the other operations on
tree automata that are needed in order to solve rational synthesis. An exception is the problem of emptiness. In
the Boolean case, tree-automata emptiness is reduced to deciding a two-player game [12]. Such games are played
between an ∨-player, who has a winning strategy iff the automaton is not empty (essentially, the ∨-player chooses
the transitions with which the automaton accepts a witness tree), and a ∧-player, who has a winning strategy
otherwise (essentially, the ∧-player chooses a path in the tree that does not satisfy the acceptance condition). A
winning strategy for the ∨-player induces a labeled tree accepted by the tree automaton.
In latticed games, deciding a game amounts to finding a lattice value l such that the ∨-player can force the
game to computations in which his payoff is at least l. The value of the game need not be achieved by a single
strategy and algorithms for analyzing latticed games consider values that emerge as the join of values obtained
by following different strategies [16, 36]. A labeled tree, however, relates to a single strategy. Therefore, the
emptiness problem for latticed tree automata, to which the latticed rational synthesis is reduced, cannot be reduced
to solving latticed games. Instead, one has to consider the single-strategy variant of latticed games, namely the
problem of finding values that the ∨-player can ensure by a single strategy. We address this problem below.
Theorem 5.2 Consider a latticed Bu¨chi gameG. Given a lattice element l, we can construct a Boolean generalized-
Bu¨chi game Gl such that the ∨-player can achieve value greater or equal l in G using a single strategy iff the
∨-player wins in Gl. The size of Gl is bounded by |G| · |Ł|2 and G1 has at most |Ł| acceptance sets.
Using Theorem 5.2, we can solve the latticed rational synthesis problem in a fashion similar to the one we used
in the Boolean case. We represent strategy profiles by Σ-labeled Σ-trees, and sets of profiles by tree automata.
We construct two Boolean generalized-Bu¨chi tree automata. The first, denoted A0, for the language of all profiles
π in which payoff0(π) ≥ v, and the second, denoted AN , for the language of all Nash equilibria. The intersection
of A0 and AN then contains all the solutions to the latticed rational synthesis problem. Thus, solving the problem
amounts to returning a witness to the nonemptiness of the intersection, and we have the following.
Theorem 5.3 The latticed rational-synthesis problem for objectives in LDBW and the solution concept of Nash
equilibrium is in EXPTIME.
We note that the lower complexity with respect to the Boolean setting (Theorem 4.2) is only apparent, as the
objectives are given in LDBWs, which are less succinct than LLTL formulas [15, 20].
6 Discussion
We introduced rational synthesis — synthesizing a system that functions in a rational environment. As in tradi-
tional synthesis, one cannot control the agents that constitute the environment. Unlike traditional synthesis, the
agents have objectives, we can suggest a strategy for each agent, and we can assume that rational agents follow
strategies they have no incentive to deviate from.
The solution of the rational synthesis problem relies on an extension of strategy logic [7]. The modularity of
our solution separates the game-theoretic considerations and the synthesis technique. Indeed our technique can
be applied to any solution concept that can be expressed in extended strategy logic. We show that for the com-
mon solution concepts of dominant strategies equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, and subgame perfect equilibrium,
rational synthesis has the same complexity as traditional synthesis The versatility of the extended logic enables
many extensions of the setting. For example, one can associate different solutions concepts with different sub-
specifications. In particular, it is often desirable in practice to ensure that some properties of the system hold
regardless of the rationality of the agents. This can be done by letting the specifier specify, in addition to ϕ0, also
an LTL formula ϕ′0 (typically ϕ0 → ϕ′0) that should be satisfied in the traditional synthesis interpretations, namely
in all environments.
References
[1] B. Aminof, O. Kupferman, and R. Lampert. Reasoning about online algorithms with weighted automata. In Proc. 20th
SODA, pages 835–844, 2009.
[2] P.C. Attie, A. Arora, and E.A. Emerson. Synthesis of fault-tolerant concurrent programs. TOPLAS, 26:128–185, 2004.
[3] A. Chakrabarti, K. Chatterjee, T.A. Henzinger, O. Kupferman, and R. Majumdar. Verifying quantitative properties
using bound functions. In Proc. 13th CHARME, LNCS 3725, pages 50–64, 2005.
[4] K. Chatterjee, L. Doyen, and T. Henzinger. Quantative languages. In Proc. 17th CSL, LNCS 5213, pages 385-400,
2008.
[5] K. Chatterjee, T. Henzinger, and B. Jobstmann. Environment assumptions for synthesis. In Proc. 19th CONCUR,
LNCS 5201, pages 147–161, 2008.
[6] K. Chatterjee, T. Henzinger, and M. Jurdzinski. Games with secure equilibria. Theoretical Computer Science, 2006.
[7] K. Chatterjee, T. A. Henzinger, and N. Piterman. Strategy logic. In 18th CONCUR, LNCS, pages 59–73, 2007.
[8] K. Chatterjee and T.A. Henzinger. Assume-guarantee synthesis. In Proc. 13th TACAS, LNCS 4424, pages 261–275,
2007.
[9] K. Chatterjee, R. Majumdar, and M. Jurdzinski. On Nash equilibria in stochastic games. In Proc. 13th CSL, LNCS
3210, pages 26–40, 2004.
[10] A. Church. Logic, arithmetics, and automata. In Proc. Int. Congress of Mathematicians, 1962, pages 23–35, 1963.
[11] E. Gra¨del, W. Thomas, and T. Wilke. Automata, Logics, and Infinite Games: A Guide to Current Research, LNCS
2500, 2002.
[12] Y. Gurevich and L. Harrington. Trees, automata, and games. In Proc. 14th STOC, pages 60–65, 1982.
[13] A. Gurfinkel and M. Chechik. Multi-valued model-checking via classical model-checking. In 14th CONCUR, LNCS
2761, pages 263–277, 2003.
[14] B. Jobstmann, A. Griesmayer, and R. Bloem. Program repair as a game. In Proc 17th CAV, LNCS 3576, pages
226–238, 2005.
[15] O. Kupferman and Y. Lustig. Lattice automata. In Proc. 8th VMCAI, LNCS 4349, pages 199 – 213, 2007.
[16] O. Kupferman and Y. Lustig. Latticed simulation relations and games. In 5th ATVA, LNCS 4762, pages 316–330,
2007.
[17] O. Kupferman, N. Piterman, and M.Y. Vardi. Safraless compositional synthesis. In Proc 18th CAV, LNCS 4144, pages
31–44, 2006.
[18] O. Kupferman and M.Y. Vardi. Synthesizing distributed systems. In Proc. 16th LICS, pages 389–398, 2001.
[19] O. Kupferman and M.Y. Vardi. Safraless decision procedures, In Proc. 46th FOCS, pages 531–540, 2005.
[20] O. Kupferman and M.Y. Vardi. From linear time to branching time. TOCL, 6(2):273–294, 2005.
[21] O. Kupferman and M.Y. Vardi. Memoryful branching-time logics. In Proc. 21st LICS, pages 265–274, 2006.
[22] O. Kupferman and M.Y. Vardi. Weak alternating automata and tree automata emptiness. In Proc. 30th STOC, pages
224–233, 1998.
[23] Y. Lustig and M.Y. Vardi. Synthesis from component libraries. In Proc. 12th FOSSACS, LNCS 5504, pages 395–409,
2009.
[24] Z. Manna and A. Pnueli. The Temporal Logic of Reactive and Concurrent Systems: Specification. Springer, 1992.
[25] R. van der Meyden and T. Wilke. Synthesis of distributed systems from knowledge-based specifications. In 16th
CONCUR, LNCS 3653, pages 562–576, 2005.
[26] D.E. Muller and P.E. Schupp. Alternating automata on infinite trees. Theoretical Computer Science, 54:267–276, 1987.
[27] J.F. Nash. Equilibrium points in n-person games. In Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America, 1950.
[28] N. Nisan and A. Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design. In Proc. 31st STOC, pages 129–140, 1999.
[29] N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. V. Vazirani. Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press,
2007.
[30] M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. The MIT Press, 1994.
10
c
2
a, c a,b
a1 a2
c1 c2 b2 b1
1
0
c
2
a, c a,b
a1 a2
c1 c2 b2 b1
1
0
c
2
a, c a,b
a1 a2
c1 c2 b2 b1
Figure 1: A game, two Nash equilibria and one subgame-perfect equilibrium.
[31] A. Pnueli. The temporal logic of programs. In Proc. 18th FOCS, pages 46–57, 1977.
[32] A. Pnueli and R. Rosner. On the synthesis of a reactive module. In Proc. 16th POPL, pages 179–190, 1989.
[33] P.J.G. Ramadge and W.M. Wonham. The control of discrete event systems. IEEE Transactions on Control Theory,
77:81–98, 1989.
[34] R. Rosner. Modular Synthesis of Reactive Systems. PhD thesis, Weizmann Institute of Science, 1992.
[35] R. Selten. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. International Journal
of Game Theory, 4(1):25–55, March 1975.
[36] S. Shoham and O. Grumberg. Multi-valued model checking games. In Proc. 3rd ATVA, LNCS 3707, pages 354–369,
2005.
[37] M. Ummels. Rational behaviour and strategy construction in infinite multiplayer games. In Proc. 26th FSTTCS, LNCS
4337, pages 212–223, 2006.
[38] M.Y. Vardi and P. Wolper. Reasoning about infinite computations. Information and Computation, 115(1):1–37, 1994.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
The construction proceeds by induction on the structure of Ψ. Note that while the APT is defined with respect to
Υ-labeled Σ-trees, a base formula ψ(z, h) focuses on a (Σ × {⊥,⊤}) projection of the label (the one assigning
values to the variables in z and h). We describe here in detail the base case, where Ψ = ψ(z, h). The case
where Ψ = ψ(h) can be derived from the case Ψ = ψ(z, h) by checking in addition that only the root is labeled
⊤. The cases Ψ is of the form Ψ1 ∨ Ψ2,¬Ψ1,∃zi.Ψ1, and ∃h.Ψ1 follow from the closure of APTs to union,
complementation, and projection.
The complexity analysis follows from the fact that the automaton for ψ(z, h) is exponential in ψ, and each
sequence of quantifiers that increases the alternation depth by one, involves an exponential blow up in the state
space and a polynomial blow up in the index [26]. Thus, the number of states in AΨ is (d + 1)-exponential in Ψ
and the index of AΨ is polynomial (of degree d) in Ψ, where d is the alternation depth of Ψ. Since the projection
operation results in a nondeterministic (rather than an alternating) tree automaton, the emptiness check when the
last operation is projection does not involve an additional exponential blow up.
Let Ψ = ψ(z, h). Given an LTL formula ψ, one can construct an APT Uψ with 2O(|ψ|) states and index 3
such that Uψ accepts all trees all of whose paths satisfy ψ [38]. Let Uψ = 〈Σ,Σ, Q, δ0, δ, χ〉. For the first and
second tasks we use four states qhis, qfut, qacc, and qrej. The automaton AΨ starts by sending two copies, one at
the initial state of Uψ and one at qhis. The copy in state qhis follows the history, i.e. the path marked with ⊤
labels. When it reads a node with a ⊥ label, marking that the history ends and the future begins, it moves to the
state qfut. From the state qfut, this copy checks that the agents adhere to the strategy. If a violation of the strategy
is detected, the copy concludes that ψ need not be evaluated along the path it traversed and moves to qacc. If
another ⊤ has been read, the copy conclude that the {⊤,⊥}-component is illegal and moves to qrej. Formally,
AΨ = 〈Σ×{⊥,⊤},Σ, Q∪{qhis, qfut, qacc, qrej}, δ0∧qhis, ν, χ′〉, where for every σ ∈ Σ, ⊣∈ {⊥,⊤}, the transition
function ν is defined as follows. Note that the alphabet of AΨ is Υ, rather than Σ×{⊥,⊤}. Since, however, base
formulas refer to a single strategy profile and history variable, we restrict attention to the relevant components of
the input alphabet.
• ν(qacc, 〈σ,⊣ 〉) = qacc and ν(qrej, 〈σ,⊣ 〉) = qrej. • ν(qhis,〈σ,⊤〉) =
∨
d∈Σ ((d, qhis) ∧
∧
d′∈Σ\{d}(d
′, qacc)).
• For every q ∈ Q, we have ν(q,〈σ,⊣ 〉) = δ(q, σ). • ν(qfut,〈σ,⊤〉) =
∧
d∈Σ(d, qrej).
• ν(qhis,〈σ,⊥〉) =
∧
d∈Σ(d, qfut). • ν(qfut,〈σ,⊥〉) =
∧
d∈Σ (
∧
d=σ(d, qfut) ∧
∧
d6=σ(d, qacc)).
The parity condition χ′ is such that χ′(q) = χ(q) for every q ∈ Q and for the other states we have χ′(qacc) = 0,
χ′(qrej) = 1, χ′(qhis) = 1, and χ′(qfut) = 0.
It is easy to see that a tree 〈Σ∗, τ〉 is accepted by AΨ iff there is a word w ∈ Σ∗ such that for every prefix u of
w the node u is labeled 〈σ,⊤〉 for some σ ∈ Σ and outcome(τ)w |= ψ. The number of states of AΨ is exponential
in ϕ and its index is 3.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 5.2
Consider a lattice Ł. An element x ∈ Ł is join irreducible if for all y, z ∈ Ł we have x ≤ y ∨ z implies x ≤ y
or x ≤ z. Given l, we define the game Gl as follows. Let Xl = {x ∈ JI(Ł) | x ≤ l} be the set of join irreducible
elements smaller then l. By Birkhoff’s representation theorem, a strategy ensures a value greater or equal l iff for
every x ∈ Xl the strategy ensures a value greater or equal x.
By the analysis in [16], the value of a latticed play p in a game G can be decomposed into three values: the
acceptance value acc(p), and two values r∨ and r∧ that have to do with value relinquished by the ∨-player and the
∧-player during the play, respectively. Furthermore, the values r∨ and r∧ are the limits of the sequences {r∨i }∞i=0
and {r∧i }∞i=0 where for every i ≥ 0 the values of r∨i and r∧i depend on the i-long prefix of the play p.
The idea underlying the reduction is to consider a Boolean game in which the values from the latticed game are
made explicit by the structure of the game graph. Formally, for a latticed game G = {V,E} with V = V∨ ∪ V∧
and an Ł-Bu¨chi condition F ∈ ŁV , we define a Boolean generalized-Bu¨chi game G′l = {V ′, E′} as follows. The
state space V ′ = V × Ł × Ł is such that in a state (u, x, y) ∈ V × Ł× Ł, we have that u stands for a state in G,
the value x stands for the ∨-relinquished value r∨i , and the value y stands for the ∧-relinquished value r∧i .
Let G = {V,E} be a latticed game with an Ł-Bu¨chi condition F ∈ ŁV and initial vertex v0 ∈ V . The
simplification of G for l ∈ Ł, denoted G′l, is the Boolean game G′l = {V ′, E′} where V ′ = V × Ł × Ł, and the
partition of V ′ and E′ is defined as follows. First, V ′∨ = V∨×Ł×Ł and V ′∧ = V∧×Ł×Ł (note that even though
G′l is Boolean, we keep the names ∨-player and ∧-player). The initial vertex is 〈v0,⊤,⊥〉. In order to define the
edges we introduce the following notation. For u, u′ ∈ V and x, y ∈ Ł the u′-successor of 〈u, x, y〉 is 〈u′, x′, y′〉,
where either u ∈ V∨ in which case x′ = x ∧ (E(u, v) ∨ y) and y′ = y, or u ∈ V∧ in which case x′ = x and
y′ = y ∨ (E(u, v) ∧ x). Now, E′ = {(〈u, x, y〉, 〈u′, x′, y′〉) | 〈u′, x′, y′〉 is the u′-successor of 〈u, x, y〉}.
It is left to define the generalized-Bu¨chi condition. In order to ensure the value l ∈ Ł, the ∨-player must
“collect” every value x ∈ Xl either as a value relinquished by the ∧-player or by the acceptance value acc. For
that, we define, for each x ∈ Xl a set Fx in the generalized-Bu¨chi condition. We define Fx = (V × Ł × {y ∈
Ł | y ≥ x})∪ ({u ∈ V | F (u) ≥ x)\V ×{y ∈ Ł | y 6≥ x}×Ł). The first component states for states in which the
∧-player relinquished x, and the second component stands for states in which both the acceptance value is greater
then x and x was not relinquished by the ∨-player in the past. Now, the generalized-Bu¨chi acceptance condition
is F ′ = {Fx | x ∈ Xl}.
Assume first there exists a single strategy π in G ensuring value greater or equal l. Every strategy π for G
(for either player) induces a strategy π′ in G′l in which π′(〈u0, x0, y0〉, . . . , 〈un, xn, yn〉) is the π(u0, . . . , un)-
successor of 〈un, xn, yn〉. Consider a ∨-player strategy π that ensures value greater or equal l. We show that π′ is
winning in G′l. It is not hard to see that a play p′ = 〈u0, x0, y0〉 . . . 〈un, xn, yn〉 . . . consistent with π′ corresponds
to a play p = u0 . . . un . . . consistent with π. Furthermore, for every i ≥ 0, we have xi = r∨i and yi = r∧i . Since
π ensures value l in G, the value of p is greater or equal l, and therefore, for every join irreducible x ∈ Vx we have
val(p) ≥ x. Thus, either there exists an index i from which r∧i ≤ x or for infinitely many i’s we have F (ui) ≥ x
and r∨i ≥ x. Both cases imply that the set Fx is traversed infinitely often. Thus the play p′ is winning for the
∨-player in G′l.
Assume now that π′ is a winning strategy for the ∨-player in G′l. The strategy π′ induces a ∨-player strategy
in G in the following way: Every prefix of a play p = u0, u1, . . . , un in G induces the prefix of a play p′ =
〈u0,⊤,⊥〉, 〈u0, x1, y1〉, . . . , 〈un, xn, yn〉, where for every i > 0, we have that 〈ui, xi, yi〉 is the ui-successor of
〈ui−1, xi−1, yi−1〉. We define π(p) to be the state u for which π′(p′) is 〈u, x, y〉. It is not hard to see that for a
play p in G consistent with π, and for every i ≥ 0, we have xi = r∨i and yi = r∧i . As π′ is winning in G′l, we get
that for every x ∈ Xl we have val(p) ≥ x, and therefore val(p) ≥ l.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 5.3
Approaching the problem in a fashion similar to the one we used in the Boolean case, we represent strategy
profiles by Σ-labeled Σ-trees, and sets of profiles by tree automata. We construct two Boolean tree automata.
The first, denoted A0, for the language of all profiles π in which payoff0(π) ≥ v, and the second, denoted AN ,
for the language of all Nash equilibria. It is not hard to see that the intersection of A0 and AN contains all the
solutions to the latticed rational synthesis problem. Thus, solving the problem amounts to returning a witness to
the nonemptiness of the intersection.
For the purposes of complexity analysis, we denote by si the size of the LDBW for the i-th agent specification,
by s = max{si} the maximal si, and by m = |Ł| the size of the lattice.
We first construct A0. As in the Boolean case, we first construct an LDBTA′0 that maps a strategy profile π to
payoff0(π). Using Theorem 5.2, we can construct from A′0 the required Boolean tree automaton A0. To see how,
note that the generalized-Bu¨chi game involved has a very uniform structure. From every ∨-vertex, the ∨-player
has exactly one choice associated with each σ ∈ Σ. (This property is inherited from the latticed game which in
turn inherits it from the fact that the alphabet of A′0 is Σ.) A similar property holds for the ∧-player (this property
is inherited from the fact that A′0 runs on Σ-trees). Therefore, the generalized-Bu¨chi game can be reduced, using
standard techniques, to a generalized-Bu¨chi tree automaton A0. The size of A′0 is s0 · m2 and the number of
acceptance sets in its generalized Bu¨chi condition is bounded by m.
We now turn to build an automaton for Nash equilibria AN . We construct AN as an intersection of n automata
{AiN}
n
i=1, where the language of AiN is the set of the profiles that satisfy payoffi(π−i, π′i) ≤ payoffi(π). By
Birkhoff’s representation theorem, an equivalent criteria would be that for every join irreducible element j ∈
JI(Ł), we have payoffi(π−i, π′i) ≥ j → payoffi(π, ϕi) ≥ j. Given LDBW for ϕi, it is not hard to construct
LDBTs for payoffi(π−i, π′i) and payoffi(π). For every join irreducible element j ∈ JI(Ł) we would like to make
sure that payoffi(π−i, π′i) ≥ j → payoffi(π, ϕi) ≥ j. To that end, we use the construction of the Boolean game
G⊤ in the proof of Theorem 5.2. Recall that in the game G⊤, the value x is obtained by a single strategy iff the
acceptance set Fx is visited infinitely often. Thus, for a specific agent i ≤ n, and a join irreducible element
j ∈ JI(L), we can construct a Boolean Bu¨chi tree automaton Bij , of size O(si · m2), that accepts exactly the
trees encoding profiles for which payoffi(π, ϕi) ≥ j. In a similar way, we can construct a tree automaton Cij , of
similar size, that accepts trees encoding profiles for which payoffi(π−i, π′i) ≥ j. Combining Bij and Cij we can
get a Streett automaton Aij that accepts profiles for which payoffi(π−i, π′i) ≥ j → payoffi(π, ϕi) ≥ j. The size
of Aij is O(s2i × m4), and it has one Streett pair. Note that for a fixed i, the automata Aij share their structure
and only differ in the acceptance condition. Therefore, for a fixed i ≤ n, we can construct an automaton AiN , of
size O(s2i ·m4) and with O(m) pairs, that accepts profiles for which payoffi(π−i, π′i) ≥ j → payoffi(π, ϕi) ≥ j
for every join irreducible element j ∈ JI(Ł). By intersecting the automata AiN we get an automaton AN of size
(s ·m)O(n), with O(m · n) pairs.
The intersection ofA0 andAN is a Streett automaton of size (s·m)O(n) and with O(m·n) pairs. Its emptiness
can then be checked in time (s ·m)O(m·n2) [22], and we are done.
